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As all of you in the present audience surely know, the Spanish Civil War 
has occupied, and pre-occugpied, me for almost forty years, or well over half 
of my entire life span. I have written two books, and many articles, on the 
subject. It played a prominent role in all my three decades of teaching both 
general European history and modern Spanish history. And on numerous occa-
sions in 1986 I took part in fiftieh anniversary commemorations in the form of 
round tables and lectures in Spanish universities, municipalities, and ateneos. 
With an audience this evening composed predominantly of students and profes-
sors I am confident that it is not nescessary to offer a general lecture on the 
civil war, even though this is the beginning of the course of lectures. I would 
like to use my allotted time in a way that would be more interesting to you as 
fellow investigators and teachers, and it seems to me that one such way would 
be to devote my lecture to questions of interpretation. 
I hope at the outset that you will forgive me a few autobiographical para-
graphs. It is the duty of any historian to write and speak as objectively as is 
humanly possible, but he or she does not live in a vacuum. The selection and 
interpretation of data, the relative weight given to different phases of the sub-
ject, will inevitably be influenced by the context of the historian's own life. I 
propose to begin then by mentioning those factors of timing and context which, 
so far as I can judge my own case impersonally, have been important in sha-
ping my original interpretation and the various nuances of change in my views 
with the passage of time. 
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The most intensive period of work was the decade 1954-64. That decade 
included an invaluable two year fellowship in Spain and France, during which 
time I haunted the hemerotecas, interviewed some 120 political and military 
participants in the civil war, and wrote most of the first draft of The Spanish 
Republic and the Civil War. During the other eight years i was engaged in 
fulltime teachingt of modern European and Latin American history. I spent 
somewhat more time with my wife and young children than did many of my 
colleagues, feeling that I would rather «produce» more slowly than trúncate the 
unique experience of raising a family. But in those eight years virtuaily all my 
waking hours that were not absorbed by my teaching or by my family were 
devoted to reading everything I could iay my hands on concerning Spain from 
approximately 1875 to the end of the civil war in 1939. From Wellesley CoUege 
I made fortnightly trips to the Harvard University Library, and during several 
summers I spent short periods reading in the Library Of Congress those books 
and pamphlets wich were not available at Harvard. I need hardly emphasize 
how wonderful it is, in an American university library, to be able to borrow for 
severa! weeks any book which is not a rare and therefore irreplaceable item. I 
do not see how, just physically, I coul have written the Princeton book, and my 
scholarly articles, without the borrowing privileges of the Harvard Library. 
Turning now to the context: the Spain which I first knew as a gradúate 
student in 1951 had barely begun to recover from the disastrous effects of the 
civil war. Maimed veterans of the victorious army as serenos in the urban 
apartment complexes; Andalusian children with eye diseases and suffering evi-
dently from general malnutrition; people selling single cigarettes, or sticks of 
chewing gum, rather than packages; several different sorts of pólice on every 
sidewalk; a completely censored press and radio. National Catholicism and a 
repressive dictatorship ruled Spain, and in the United States students with 
leftist convictions or personal associations, myself among them, were being 
pursued by McCarthyism. Later, during the decade of my intensive research 
(1954-64) the economic situation of Spain, and the political atmosphere of both 
Spain an the US, improved considerably. On the one hand then 1 felt constan-
tly motivated by my hatred of all dictatorships and all forms of political repres-
sion. On the other hand I felt democracy to be recovering in my own country; 
and in Spain, much as I disliked the dictatorship I could see that material 
conditions were improving and that people were not as afraid to utter their 
thoughts as they had been in 1951. 
Since 1965 the study of the civil war has occupied me much less than in the 
prior decade. By sheer accident of circumstances I became the founding chair-
man of department at the new branch of the University of California establis-
hed in San Diego (referred to also the La Jolla campus). Betwen 1966 an 1983 I 
also served in a number of other elective and administrative posts. I wrote a 
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short book on medieval Spain for the «Library of European Civilization» being 
edited by the distinguished English historian Geoffrey Barroclough. I wrote a 
novel concerning a miscarriage of justice in the US during the MacCarthy era. I 
helped to design and administer, as well as teach, an introductory course in the 
humanities for students most of whom were going to become scientists. I 
believe that this seventeen year stretch combining teaching with administration 
and with frequent political contact with municipal and state officials, has cer-
tainly contributed to my understanding of how power is actually exercised in a 
democratic capitalist society. And I believe that such experience is very useful 
for apracticing historian. But with regard to my work on the Spanish civil war 
it means that my new thinking has been based on reading the post-1965 publi-
cations of other scholars rather than on new archival research of my own. 
There are five áreas of interpretation in wich new data from post 1965 
publications, or personal political experiences and reflections of my own, have 
altered some of the opinions I expressed in The Spanish Republic and the Civil 
War. Let me first ñame them, and then proceed to a sepárate discussion of 
each: 1) the relative importance of persons as against that of economic and 
social forces; 2) the quantity ant the military importance of foreign troops and 
arms; 3) the number of reprisal deaths on both sides; 4) the role of statistical 
data; 5) the interpretation of the entire history of the republic and the war as 
phases in the modernization of Spain. 
With regard to the first subject: during the I950's I was very powerfully 
influenced by the several currents of Spanish thought which emphasize the im-
portance of individual human beings, their education, their morality, their ca-
pacity for leadership. I had written my doctoral thesis on Joaquín Costa. I was 
in complete agreement with his slogan «escuela y despensa.» I admired tre-
mendously, and needless to say, I continué to admire tremendously, the foun-
ders of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, with their constant emphasis on the 
need to form persons as the first necessity for achieving political liberty and 
social justice in late 19th and early 20th century Spain. I was deeply imprressed 
by the «yo y mis circunstancias» of Ortega y Gasset and by the «vivir desvi-
viéndose» and the impassioned humanism of Américo Castro. I listened to 
speculations about the importance of generations and of small nuclei of cultural 
leaders from the lips of Jaume Vicens Vives. I had several conversations with 
Manuel Lorenzo Pardo, the great hydraulic engineer of the Confederación del 
Ebro, for whom both Joaquín Costa, and General Primo de Rivera, in their 
different ways, represented the type of regenerationism, of revolutoion from 
above, which could rescue Spain from its centuries of backwardness. I had 
conversations on different aspects of the civil war with Manuel Giménez Fer-
nández, leader of the liberal wing of the CEDA; with Indalecio Prieto, ablest of 
the parliamentary socialists; with Amos Salvador, personal and political friend 
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of Azaña; with Dionisio Ridruejo, with General Vicente Rojo, and with Manuel 
de Irujo and other members of the «Delegation Basque» in Paris. The memo-
ries of defeat, and the circumstances of exile, external or internal, may well 
have exaggerated in these men's minds the importance of individual acts. But all 
of them intrepreted their experience much more in terms of personal decisions 
and attitudes than in terms of impersonal social forces. When writing The 
Spanish Republic arid the Civil War, especially in passages discussing the fai-
lure of republican era reforms, and in passages discussing acts of fanatical and 
senseless cruelty during the war, I was deeply, if at the time unintentionally, 
influenced by those many readings and many conversations emphasizing the 
importance of subjective human motives. 
In my later work, The Concise History, and the introduction and explana-
tory notes for the anthology of documents. Entre la reforma y la revolución, 
the emphasis is more on social and economic forces and less on persons. I am 
inclined to attribute the change as much to my personal experience as to the 
reading of much new economic and social history in connection with my tea-
ching duties. My political and administrative experiences in the University 
of California took place under two successive governors, Ronald Reagan and 
Jerry Brown, who repeatedly slashed the proposed operating budget of the 
university. The equiping of laboratories and libraries costs a great deal of 
money and does not, at least in the inmediate sense, win votes. As of the 
mid-sixties the salary scale of the UC was one of the highest in the country, 
and California industry was also doing very well. It therefore seemed perfectly 
feasible to cut the university budget, and to «wait and see» whether these cuts 
would affect the quality of the faculty and the applied science benefits to wich 
State industry was accustomed. Through the 1970's the university slowly suffe-
red attrition of its best faculty and thus of its national reputation. When, in 
1982, a major industrial scientific Corporation .decided that Texas would be a 
more favorable área than San Diego because in the opinión of the corporation 
Texas treated its university better than did California, the governor and the 
State legislature began to treat the university far more favorably than during the 
entire seventeen years of my teaching and administrative activity. I did not 
take the matter personally, but I could not fail to note that one practical 
economic decisión taken by an important industry was far more influential than 
all the educational plans and the persuasive efforts of a faculty concerned with 
intellectual quality and cultural valúes. As a matter of fact I continué to believe 
that education is the key to any general improvements in the quality of human 
existence, but I am equally convinced that the subjective motivations of indivi-
dual leaders, no matter how intelligent, idealistic, and energetic, have only a 
marginal influence over economic and political decisions. 
With regard to my second topic, the role of foreign troops and arms, my 
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views of their significance have not changed, but some of the quantitative 
estimates have. I believe just as firmly today as 1 did in 1965 that foreign 
intervention was decisive during thbe entire course of the war. The insurgent 
forces under General Mola in the north would have been stalled without the 
arrival of American oil. The forces under General Franco would have been 
unable to eróos from North África without the arrival of Italian, and a little 
later, Germán transport and bombing planes. During the same early weeks of 
the war the Salazar government in Portugal offered immediate port and rail 
facilities to the Insurgents, and the oil companies and port authorities at Tan-
gier refused to sell oil or permit ship repairs to the republican navy. Without 
these key forms of foreign aid the generáis would have been obliged in August 
1936 to negotiate a settlement with the legitímate republican government. 
Foreign aid to the republic was decisive for the initial defense of Madrid in 
November-December 1936. Without the fírst few dozen Soviet tanks and air-
craft, without the handful of serviceable French airplanes, and without the 
example of disciplined infantry tactics supplied by the newly formed Interna-
tional Brigades, Madrid would almost surely have fallen. Throughout the years 
1937 an 1938 foreing intervention continuedto play a decisive role. Italian, 
Germán and Moorish troops were necessary to all the offensive operations of 
General Franco; likewise the Italian and Germán supplies of planes, tanks, 
motor vehicles, rifles and machine guns, and Communications equipment. Ita-
lian submarines and surface ships constituted the bulk of the Nationalist Navy. 
The misnamed International policy of «Non-Intervention» effectively prevented 
the republic from buying arms anywhere except in the Soviet Union and on the 
black market while at the same time it permitted the massive and eventually 
victorious Germán - Italian - Portuguese intervention to proceed without hin-
drance. On the republican side Russian tanks and planes, and the International 
Brigades, were essential to the few brief offensive successes of the republic and 
to its long, dogged defense. 
Many important studies of foreign intervention have appeared in the past 
twenty years, the most important being those of Robert Whealey, Ángel Viñas, 
the brothers Jesús and Ramón Salas Larrazábal, John Coverdale, Michael Al-
pert, Willard Frank, Juan García Duran, Paul Preston, and Hugh Thomas in the 
appendix of his third edition in 1977. The principal changes which they have 
made in my quantitative understanding of foreign intervention can be summari-
zed as follows: 50-100 fewer Italian planes than I had supposed in 1965, a 
revisión in accord with the results of the studies of John Coverdale and the 
appendix of Hugh Thomas; a slightly larger total of Germán aircraft and about 
100 more operational Russian planes in the battle of the Ebro; a probable total 
of Moorish troops somewhat higher than my original estímate. In 1965 I wrote 
that about 100.000 moors served in the Franquist army during the war as a 
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whole. But he studies of Charles R. Halstead indícate a total of 70-80.000 
serving from late 1937 to the end of the war. Since the original moorish contin-
gents suffered enormous casualties during the fall, 1936 march to Madrid, the 
actual siege of the city, and the battle of the Jarama in February, 1937, the total 
number of moors for the war must be somewhat over 100.000. 
But slight changes in the probable numbers of foreign airplanes and moorish 
infantry are not really of great significance. Quantitatively speaking the most 
importan! difference concerns Italian naval participation. In 1965 I wrote that 
Italian submarines and Italian and Germán aircraft sank dozens of ships on 
their way to republican ports. But I had no quantitative Information except for 
the fact that in late 1937 Italy was known to have transferred four destroyers 
and two submarines from her own to the Nationalist navy. The articles of 
Willard Frank and Juan García Duran, published in Historia 16 in 1977, show 
that Italy supplied some 56 submarines and 25 surface ships to the Franquist 
navy, and that Germany supplied about 140 cargo vessels. 
With one exception my figures on personnel and land and aír armaments, 
both in 1965 and in later writíngs, approximate closely the figures gíven by 
Hugh Thomas in his third edition appendix. That exception is the number of 
Soviet tanks and airplanes supplied to the republican army, Thomas gives 
totals of 900 tanks and 1.000 planes. The figure for tanks is based on the 
estímate made by the Germán military attache in Turkey. The attache could 
count the number of Russian freighters passing through the Dardanelles, but 
the could not see what was below decks. We have no way of knowing what his 
other sources of Information were, and no other documents have been cited in 
the half century since the events. On the other hand, none of the many able 
military correspondents covering the civil war ever mentioned seeing more 
than about 100 tanks even at the moments of máximum republican concentra-
tion such as at Brúñete, Teruel, and the Ebro. Tanks are very difficult objects 
to hide, and so on the basis of experienced journalistic observation during the 
war itself I very much doubt that anything like 900 Russian tanks arrived in 
Spain. The estímate of Ángel Viñas, about 400, seems much more reasonable, 
and makes ampie allowance for ínstances that may not have been reported by 
the press. 
The figure of 1.000 for aircraft relies heavíly on the reasoning of General 
Jesús Larrazábal, to the effect that airplane motors are numbered consecuti-
vely wíthout gaps, but manufacturers often skíp lO's pr even lOO's of numbers, 
for a variety of reasons, and thus his method of counting paper numbers does 
not seem to me as convíncing as fíeld observatíons whích allot the republic 
2-300 operatíonal planes at moments of máximum effort such as Brúñete and 
the Ebro. The republican avíation colonel Andrés García Lacalle, in his 1973 
memoirs published in México, speaks of a máximum of 5-600 fighter planes and 
Interpreting the Spunish Civil Wcir 17 
100 heavy bombers. Commenting on a reference by Salas to 100 I-16's supposediy 
assembled at Alicante, García Lacalle states that none of these fuselages ever had a 
motor or armament installed. I am therefore inclined to continué thinking that 700 
would be the proper approximation rather than 1.000 for the total of operational 
Soviet planes. I discussed quantities of Soviet aid in more detail on pp. 10-12of the 
1977 Critica edition of La República española y ¡a Guerra Civil and pp. 393-4 of 
Entre la reforma y la revolución. 
The.most important quantitative change in my views since 1965 has to do 
with the category of reprisal shootings on both sides. I now believe that my 
first estimates were at least twice too high for the number of executions by the 
victorious military and twice too low for the paseos perpetrated by the violent 
minority within the Popular Front. Before discussing the changed numbers I 
would like to summarize the reasons why I beleived, and continué to believe, 
that the Right its enemies in far greater numbers than did the Left: 
1. The insurgen military were conscious of being a small minority attac-
king a popular government. Nothing shows this more clearly than their fre-
quent use of the slogan «Viva la república» to bring their troops out of the 
barracks and to confuse or tranquillize the civilian populace. 
2. When their pronunciamiento failed they found themselves with relati-
vely few troops, and felt it necessary to consolídate their hostile rearguard in 
Andalusia, Extremadura, Galicia, and Asturias by a policy of swift terror. 
3. A large percentage of the population were by definition their enemies: 
the republican middie class, the masons, teachers, intellectuals, and all mem-
bers of UGT or CNT sindicates. 
4. They pictured themselves as conducting a surgical operation on a gra-
vely ill patria. They were going to eradicate physically the ills of Marxism and 
atheism, and this fanatical psychology of a cleansing purge applied both to the 
military and to the priesthood. 
5. They refused all forms of policital asylum. There were no public pro-
tests against the mass executions, and until at least late 1941 they exalted the 
examples of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as well as the inquisitorial tradition 
of the Catholic Kings. 
Regarding now the phenomenon of Popular Front zone paseos: 
1. They were the work of two small minorities within the Popular Front, 
the faction of the anarchists who believed in assassination as a normal techni-
que of social struggle, and the apparatchiks who were purging their fellow 
leftists at the orders of Stalin's secret pólice and Comintern agents. 
2. The category of enemies was numerically small: priests, civil guards, 
pre-July Falange members, landlords, empresarios, strike breakers for the 
anarchist squads; the POUM, and any presumably anti-Stalinist leadership wi-
thin the trade unions and the International Brigades, for the agents of Stalin. 
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3. The republican government broadcast repeated warnings against all 
forms of terrorism, facilitated exit visas for hundreds of threatened families, 
and permitted foreign embassies to rent extra buildings in which to house 
political refugees. 
4. The socialist, communist, POUM, and anarchist press all strongly con-
demned the paseos as a disgrace to the cause of republican Spain. 
The above are the reasons for which I have always been convinced that the 
Right murdered its enemies in much greater numbers than did the Left. But my 
quantitative estimates have changed greatly due to the availabilty of better 
demographic information and of detailed studies of some of the civil war re-
pressions. In 1965 I assumed the possible validity of the estimate made in Jesús 
Villar Salinas, Repercusiones demográficas de la última Guerra Civil española 
(Madrid, 1942) an estimate of some 800.000 deaths from all causes. My own 
total was for some 580.000, and it thus seemed to me at the time that I was 
already reducing considerably a respected demographer's conclusión. Later 
studies, in particular those of Jordi Nadal, led me to think that the likely total 
would fall in the range of 3-400.000 deaths from all causes. Most recently, 
post-dating all of my writings on the subject, Amando de Miguel on p. 193 of 
Socialismo y Guerra Civil, Ed. Pablo Iglesias, 1987, advanees a figure of 
443.000 total deaths, of which about 200.000 would be men between the ages of 
15 and 29. He, and also Ramón Salas Larrazábal in his many publications 
concerning civil war deaths, attribute many more deaths to disease than have I. 
I do not have any dogmatic attachment to my own estimates, but one reason 
for my low estimate, 50.000, is that foreign doctors and Quaker representatives 
in Spain during the war were deeply impressed by the careful attention to 
hygiene, and there are no press reports of epidemics such as the typhus epide-
mics in both the First and Second World Wars. 
The principal motive for raising my estimate of paseos from 20.000 to per-
haps 50.000 was the reading of Josep M.^ Solé i Sabaté i Joan Villarroya i Font, 
La repressio a la guerra i la posguerra a la comarca del Maresme (Monserrat, 
1983). The book proves that far more assassinations occurred in a small área 
north of Barcelona than would ever have been credible to me without such 
incontrovertible evidence. And what occurred in the maresme must surely have 
occurred in other parts of Catalunya and the Levant where anarchist terrorism 
continued sporadically throughout the two and one half year struggle. A secon-
dary but not negligible factor in my changed estimate is also my envolving 
views of the history through which I have lived. In the 1940's and '50's my 
intense antifascist and anti-right wing dictatorship sentiments, combined with 
an estremely skeptical attitude towards all anti-communist and anti-libertarian 
accusations, led me to minimize any quantitative estimate of Stalinist or anar-
chist violence even though I knew and always acknowledged the existence of 
Interpri'ting the Spunish Civil War 19 
such assassinations. I tended to believe that only Hitler, Stalin, the worst Latin 
American dictators, and Franco in his first eight years, had engaged in mass 
killings of their political opponents. 1 gave the benefit of the doubt to the many 
undemocratic Asian and African governments emerging with the retreat of 
European imperialism. In the ligh of various massacres in Indonesia, Biafra, 
the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Irán, Pakistán, India, etc. I have painfully but 
definitely arrived at the conclusión that ieftist and progresista governments and 
movements of socalled religious or national liberation can murder on the same 
massive scale as did Hitler, Stalin, and Franco. Thus the evidence of worid 
history in the past 20-25 years has prepared me to accept the evidence in Solé 
and Villaroya's book. At the same time, other local studies of nationalist zone 
repressions very much confirm my early views of the Franquist repression. For 
the reader who is interested in the full detall of my evolving views, here are the 
relevant references: pp. 455-66 (written in 1964) and pp. 12-14 (the 1976 pre-
face) of the Critica edition of La República española y la Guerra Civil; pp. 
387-92 oí Entre la reforma y la revolución, Ed. Critica, 1980; pp. 11-13 and 
155-6 of the 1986 edition of Breve historia de la Guerra Civil española. 
Finally I would like briefly to speak of changing interpretations of the shor-
tlived second republic which was destroyed by the civil war. I have separated 
this question from the other three subjects of discussion because in this ins-
tance I am not referring so much to changes in my own views as to changes in 
the prevailing views among practicing historians and political commentators. 
As of 1965 censorship was still very strong in Spain, and the only published 
versions of civil war history were clearly and unequivocally those of the vic-
tors. These versions, with the exception of a few serious military histories, 
were little more than caricatures, at least in regard to politics, economics, and 
international diplomacy. The republican leaders were referred to scornfully as 
«maricones», «fracasados», and «resentidos». Their programs were said to 
reflect either the plots of international masonry or of international bolshevism, 
or both. Ñor were the exile publications of the Left much more favorable in 
their interpretation of the republic. For both Marxists and anarchists the repu-
blic had tried to impose an outworn bourgeois model instead of proceeding to 
the revolution which «History» required and which the majority of the Spanish 
people presumably wanted. The constitution of 1931 and the legislative accom-
plishments of the republican-socialist coalition led by Prime Minister Manuel 
Azaña were criticized as mere timid beginnings of the necessary transformation 
of Spain. Azaña was jokingly referred to as the «Kerensky» of the Spanish 
revolution, or as a statesman «with a brilliant future in the past». 
The relaxation of censorship in the late 1960's, the opening towards Euro-
pean intellectual currents, sentiments of simple dignity among conservatives 
examining their own history, and the general discrediting of fascist ideology, all 
20 Gabriel Jackson 
contributed to the discredit of the caricatural versions such as those of Joaquín 
Arrarás and Eduardo Comín Colomer. On the Left, the disappointing experien-
ces of «socialismo real» in eastern Europe and the varied political and econo-
mic failures of so many Third World governments, has induced a more nuanced 
view of the shortcomings of the Spanish republic. World experience of the past 
few decades has convinced many Marxists that capitalism still has a vital 
historical role to play whereas the Marxists who lived through the civil war and 
those who wrote in the forties tended to think of capitalism as a «system with a 
brilliant future in the past», if I may paraphrase the humorous reference to 
Azaña. 
In the years since c. 1970 right of center historians such as Carlos Seco 
Serrano and Javier Tussell, and left of center historians such as Santos Julia 
and Antonio Elorza, have created an entirely new, and much superior, histo-
riography concerning the republic and the relation between the actions of repu-
blican governments and the eventual outbreak of the civil war. They do not in 
any sense hide the failures of republican leadership or of party and unión 
politics, but they treat their subjects with dignity and comprehension; and more 
important, they use documents honestly and not as bits and rags of propa-
ganda. It thus becomes possible to see the republic not as a failed forerunner to 
bolshevism or anarchist collectivism, but as the first serious effort to bring a 
substantial measure of political and reiigious liberty, social justice, regional 
autonomy, and a mixed economy to Spain as a nation in the early stages of 
bourgeois democratic development. I am especially happy in retrospect that my 
own valoration of the republic from my earliest writings was in accord with this 
later high quality Spanish historiography. I have treated the revaluation of the 
republic more extensibely in the chapter which I contributed to the volume 
edited by Ramón Tamames, La Guerra Civil Española, una reflexión moral 50 
años después (Planeta, 1986). 
